Rationalizing The Rabbis

Who can know the “mind” of Hashem?

Who can understand His “wishes?”

We were given a bare-bones Torah which needed explication; a written law in need of the oral law. But the oral law, passed on for centuries from person to person, was, as we observe in the game of “Telephone,” sometimes different at the end from the beginning.

When it comes to the understanding of specific halakhot we frequently come across differing opinions, often with conclusions that are diametrically opposed. [For examples of some of the problems, see the ENDNOTE.] Although we may be taught to follow the majority opinion, it may be unclear how that opinion was reached. And that opinion may reflect different lines of reasoning. They may come to the same conclusions but by distinct paths which may leave us with important questions left unanswered regarding situations which revolve around the route rather than the destination. We are still in need of our rabbis to guide us along these routes. But with all the disagreements that already exist, perhaps they are subject to similar variations in their opinions.

According to our tradition and practices, an individual follows all the views of a particular rabbi irrespective of his leniency or strictness. In practice, however, one checks with the rabbi most likely to give the opinion being sought. In fact, though it is not proper to do so, some people will even “shop” for opinions, choosing, after speaking with several different rabbis, to accept the opinion that they sought initially.

How have we arrived at this state? Why are there different opinions if rabbinic law reflects the teachings of Moshe at Sinai, and what Moshe was taught and what he taught were the words of Hashem? Are different rabbis conveying different words in Hashem’s name (sorry about the redundancy)? Can contradictory rulings all represent the “views” of Hashem? And what should we do when faced with our own uncertainty and with judgments which make no sense to us?

It is important to recognize at the outset that our quandary is not new. The rabbis have always been cognizant of discrepancies between opinions. Various rules have been set out to help guide us when we must make choices. For example, we follow Hillel rather than Shamai, “the rabbis” rather than an individual. That kind of bottom-line help is certainly appreciated, but it begs the question of why there are disagreements in the first place. Here, too, the rabbis attempt to deal with the problem rather than ignore it. Their solution, however, is not always one with which we are comfortable. What is often their approach is to solve the problem by denying its existence. Rather than admit that one teacher disagrees with another, an attempt is made to show that the two opinions are identical, but apply to situations which differ. Thus they cannot be compared, and the two rabbis would agree if all the circumstances were the same.

It doesn’t always work, though. Sometimes one rabbi will state that he disagrees with another, and it is difficult to explain away what was acknowledged by one of the principals to be a different opinion. It is still possible to state that one did not fully understand the position of the other or the situation about which he spoke -- that if he had known all the facts he would have decided similarly -- but it is more difficult. To do so is to cast doubt upon the new “authority,” to suggest that we are smarter or know more than he. If so, what is the standing of other rulings of his when we disagree with them? Should we follow our own views having already determined that he is subject to error?

There is no answer except to accept the fact that there is no answer, and to follow the Biblical dictum that we abide by the rabbis of our times. It's not always satisfying but, at least for the present, it's all we have. And it's the tradition.

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ENDNOTE

The usual solution to the problem is to eliminate any conflicts. For example:

Situations are different and the two Rabbis who apparently disagreed were discussing different cases. “The two opinions are really the same. The circumstances were different. In one case …”

“The Vilna Gaon” says to delete ...” -- There appear to be times when the Rabbis, faced with something that makes no sense to them or is a contradiction, simply delete what they consider in error or say that it means something else -- occasionally the opposite of what it says.

         “Here you’re talking about ...” -- There are times when the Rabbis explain something not obvious by describing a situation which is not even suggested in the text but can be made to fit and solve a problem not otherwise soluble.

         “It means the opposite.”

         “He must have meant ...”

         “He should have said ...”

         Switch the views of Sages to be consistent with other statements

September 29, 2016